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Summary 
This paper analyses strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic 
players, i.e. agents starting negotiations can split up in smaller entities during the 
bargaining process. We show that the possibility of scission in the informed coalition 
implies that it loses its information advantages. We also show that when the possibility 
of a scission exists the uninformed player does not focus on his or her beliefs about the 
strength of the informed coalition but on the proportion of weak/strong players within 
this coalition. Finally, our results show that the possibility of a scission reduces the 
incentives for the leader to propose a high offer to ensure a global agreement. We apply 
this framework to international negotiations on global public goods and to wage 
negotiations. 
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We are interested in the impact on negotiations of the fact that one of the players is not
monolithic. Using Lax and Sebenius‘s (1992) terminology, we are interested in multiparty or
multilateral bargaining and more precisely in what they call party arithmetic (adding or
subtracting parties). As Lax and Sebenius pointed out over a decade ago, most of the work on
bargaining within the strategic framework started by Rubinstein’s (1982) seminal paper has
been done assuming bilateral bargaining between two monolithic players. Nevertheless, there
are a number of relevant bargaining situations where this assumption is not pertinent.
International negotiations on trade tariffs, on agricultural subsidies in the Northern
countries, or on climate change mitigation generally take place between coalitions of
countries. Standard coalitions in these negotiations are the countries of the European Union,
which have, however, kept their autonomy at the international arena, or the G77 and China, a
highly heterogeneous coalition regrouping large developing countries (China, India or Brazil),
rich oil producers (Saudi Arabia) and extremely poor countries (the Least Developed
Countries). In recent negotiations between the United States and its allies (mainly the
European Union) on the terms and conditions of a military intervention in Iraq, the weakness
of the coalition formed by the European Union has been evident once more. Negotiations
started between the United States and the European Union, but once the possibility to split up
the coalition was clear, the United States did not any more focus on the demands of the
coalition as a whole, but on the demands of a particular sub-coalition, the one formed by the
countries meeting at the Azores (United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal and Poland). However, not
always apparently weak coalitions split-up. In the long negotiations on climate change, G77
and China have essentially managed to talk with a single voice during all the negotiation
process
2, and this in spite of the very different impacts that climate change, or an agreement to
fight climate change, could have on their economies. As stated above, G77 and China
regroups oil producers which would be harmed by any climate agreement (Saudi Arabia),
large developing countries whose main interest is not to be constraint in their urgently needed
development (China and India), but also small islands (AOSIS) or extremely poor countries
(The Least Developed Countries) which are the most vulnerable to climate change (Caparrós
et al., 2004).
The importance of not negotiating between monolithic parties is also obvious in
negotiations between an entrepreneur and the trade union representing his or her employees.
                                                
2 With some exceptions, as in the first meeting in Argentina.4
Lax and Sebenius (1992) illustrate their point by recalling negotiations between the National
Football League (NFL) and its Player’s Association (the NFLPA) over a contract in 1981.
The NFLA was a coalition made up of a few “stars” and numerous “journeymen”. Although
all players benefited, to some extend, by a union that could create a unified front with respect
to the league, different contracts could confer relative advantage to stars or to journeymen.
When the NFL’s original proposal failed and a strike began, it floated an offer for limited free
agency that suited the stars. When some of the stars began crossing the picket line, the union’s
resolve appeared to weaken. As Lax and Sebenius pointed out, “analyzing this situation as if
it were two monolithic parties would overlook crucial coalitional dynamics”.
During the nineties multilateral coalitional bargaining, within the strategic framework, has
been an important research issue. However, the models developed focus mainly on coalition
formation, without externalities (Chaterjee et al., 1993; Perry and Reny, 1994) and with
externalities (Bloch, 1996; Ray and Vohra, 1999). The issue typically modeled is the
formation of a coalition where one party proposes a coalition structure and other parties
accept it or propose an alternative coalitional structure. Nevertheless, these models do not
explicitly address the particularities of a negotiation between two (or more) non-
monolithically parties over a particular issue: a money transfer from the North to the South as
development aid, a technology transfer to fight climate change, the conditions of a military
intervention in Iraq or simply a salary to be paid by the entrepreneur to his workers. In
addition, the models quoted above assume that the coalitions are formed having in mind the
problem under consideration. However, in many real life situations the coalitions that start
negotiating are formed in a pre-game phase, so that the question is if they will negotiate as a
monolithic coalition or if they will split up. Using the examples above, the European Union
was not formed having in mind the military intervention in Iraq, the G77 and China was not
created to deal with climate change and the NFLPA was also not created to negotiate the 1981
contract.
Manzini and Mariotti (2005) analyze, as we do, negotiations that do not occur between
individuals but among groups (they use companies, trade unions or political parties as
examples). However, they analyze the impact on the negotiations outcome of different voting
rules (unanimity or majority) and do not explicitly analyze the impact of a potential scission.
Although Manzini and Mariotti refer to alliances, their paper assumes, as ours, a bargaining
framework à la Rubinstein and differs therefore from standard literature on alliances (see
Sandler and Hartley (2001) for a survey of the economics of alliances and Garfinkel (2004)
for a recent development that does not assume that “peace” prevails within the alliance).5
To analyze this kind of negotiation we develop a simple dynamic bargaining model where
one monolithic party negotiates with a non-monolithic party that has private information. We
assume that the uninformed party has a leader role in the negotiations. Thus, he, she or it (he
from now on) moves first and proposes an offer which is accepted or not, and in case of
refusal, proposes a new offer. This model is well suited to analyze negotiations between the
United Stated and the European Union described above (where the United States play a leader
role but do not know exactly the minimum demands of the European Union) and also to
model negotiations between an entrepreneur and his workers (the NFL has an obvious leader
role but it does not know the minimum requirements of its players). Finally, it can also shed
some light on the issue of negotiations between the industrialized countries and G77 and
China, as long as we assume that the industrialized countries are a monolithic party
3.
Our results show that the possibility of a scission
4 increase the chances to obtain an
agreement while it reduces the chances to obtain an agreement based on a significant amount
of transfers from the leader to the informed party. We also show that the possibility of
scission implicitly implies that the informed party looses the advantages that it had from its
private information. Thus, the informed party may benefit if it can commit before the game
starts to preclude any kind of scission, since banning the possibility of a scission leads to
‘more aggressive’ negotiation tactics. This result is, to some extent, similar to the result
obtained in Manzini and Mariotti (2005) that the unanimity rule favors more aggressive
negotiation tactics.
Finally, we show that while in a static game the leader still “sees” the original coalition, in
the dynamic game his beliefs about the original coalition disappear completely from the
expression that shapes his offers. That is, in a static game, even with the possibility of a
scission, the leader offers an amount or another taking into account his beliefs about the
strength or the weakness of the non-monolithic coalition that he is facing. However, in a
dynamic context, his offers are by no means shaped by his beliefs upon the original coalition,
but only on his beliefs about the proportion of weak or strong members of this coalition.
That is, when the United State negotiate with the European Union about an issue (the
military intervention in Iraq or agricultural subsidies) they take into account its beliefs about
the strength or the weakness of the EU demands only if they are convinced that a scission
                                                
3 In the case of climate change negotiations, the United State actually rejected the common position of the
industrialized countries of ratifying Kyoto. However, the model proposed in this paper could eventually be
applied to future negotiations between Annex I countries that have ratified Kyoto and the G77 and China.
4 We use the term “scission” to distinguish it from the closely related term of “deviation” used in cooperative
game theory and from the conceptually totally different term “player splitting” (Perea y Monsuwe et al., 2000).6
among the European Union cannot happen. On the contrary, if they think that a scission may
in fact occur, and the negotiations take longer than a single period (as they usually do) the
United States do not take into account the demands of the European Union as a whole while
shaping its offers, but just the proportion inside the European Union of strong or weak parties.
Of course, turning the argument up-side-down provides a strong incentive for potentially
unstable coalitions (the EU or G77 and China) to preclude any scission. In fact, this is the
behavior that G77 and China has tried to keep during the climate change negotiations, where
they have managed to precluded any scission in despite of their internal diversity. The
stability of that coalition could be seen as a consequence of the presence of asymmetric
information.
We will also show, however, that the straightforward strategy of assuming directly that a
given non-monolithic coalition does in fact not exist (focusing on the smallest units) is not
pertinent either, since under a given set of circumstances the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
will in fact imply that the coalition acts as a single coalition during the whole game.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and
solves it assuming that both parties are monolithic. Section 3 relaxes the assumption that
parties are monolithic and puts forward the link between the possibility of scission and the
shape of the agreement. Section 4 concludes.
2. The model without scission
The basic model that we are going to use is inspired by Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). Let
N={1,2} be two players negotiating over the transfer that player 1 will grant player 2 to obtain
a product or service that benefits both to some given extend. The good under consideration
can be the provision of a public good (e.g. fight against international terrorism or climate
change mitigation) or the provision of a good to be sold in the market (cars, or football
matches as in the example above). Player 1 is a monolithic party, a single country as the
United States, an entrepreneur or any coalition which is assumed to be stable over the
complete game. This monolithic party has a leader role in the game, because he is the owner
of the company, because the country suffered a large terrorist attack and internal pressure
forces it to act, or because it regroups a group of countries responsible for the degradation of a
common good such as climate (see footnote 2). We will call this party the “leader” of the
negotiations. Player 2 is a coalition of agents (the countries forming the European Union or
the football players), which we will assume, for the time being, to be a monolithic coalition.7
We will call this group of agents the original coalition, or just the coalition. We note  i e the
level of effort and  i p  the welfare function of player i, i˛N. Welfare functions are supposed to
be continuous and concave:
) , ( 1 2 1 1 t e e + p =  ) ( 2 1 1 e e B + -  ) , ( 1 1 1 t e C (1)
) , ( 1 2 1 2 t e e + p =  ) , ( 1 2 1 2 t e e B + -  ) ( 2 2 e C , (2)
where  i B  is the benefit obtained by player i from the efforts undertaken by both players and
i C  are the costs of the efforts for player  i.  1 t  refers to the transfers (money, technology
transfers, concessions in other subjects) received by the coalition from the leader to incentive















> 0 . (3)
Thus, the transfer is a ‘loss’ for the leader and a ‘gain’ for the coalition. That is, both players
perform an effort to provide the good (the United States and the European Union both fight
terrorism, the industrialized countries and the G77 and China both fight climate change, the
NFL and the NFLPA both provide and effort to perform football games), both benefit from
the provision of the public good (this is probably more obvious in the case of public goods
such as international terrorism or climate change than in the case of the football games,
although fame could be an additional benefit for players beyond salary), and finally the leader
is ready to transfer some benefit to the coalition (this may be political concessions in the case
of the US-EU negotiations, technology or money transfers in the case of climate change
negotiations and the salary in the case of the football League negotiations). This means that
even if both players are concerned about the (public) good, their interests diverge.
Given the leadership role that we have assigned to player 1 (the leader), he plays first and
proposes, at the same time, his level of effort  ) ( 1 e  and the amount of transfer granted to the
coalition to incentive its efforts. If the coalition accepts the offer, the agreement is struck and
it provides the agreed efforts. If the coalition does not accept, negotiations go on with a new
proposition from the leader, formed by a new program of efforts and a new amount of
transfers. If this offer is accepted, an agreement is concluded; otherwise, no agreement is
reached and both players act independently.
All features of the negotiation are known with certainty by both parties, except that the
leader does not know the real capacities (demands) of the coalition. We assume that the total8
level of effort that the leader needs to obtain, adding the effort performed by the coalition and
the effort performed by  himself, is given. We further assume that a strong coalition, in the
sense that it is able to perform a high level of effort, will have high demands, while a weak
one will have low demands. Using the example of the NFL: a coalition dominated by stars
will only play with a high salary, while a coalition of journeymen will play for less money
although unmotivated stars may perform poorly (therefore, the owner will need to perform an
important additional effort if he wants to have spectators in the matches). In climate change
negotiations (or in negotiations on efforts against international terrorism), if a coalition with
high emission reduction capacities gets a high amount of transfers it will be able to perform a
high level of abatement, while a coalition with low capacities will only be able to perform
small emission reductions, whatever the level of transfers granted. However, the coalition
with high capacities, knowing its key role, will have high demands as well. This was the case
of Russia during the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, where it demanded, and obtained, a
significant amount of concessions.
To simplify, we assume that the capacities (demands) of the coalition take one of the two
following values: 
-
2 e  and 
+
2 e , where 
-
2 e <  1 e < 
+
2 e . Either the capacities of the coalition are
low (a “weak” coalition), or they are high (a “strong” coalition). We can reduce the model
from two decision variables to only one, the amount of transfers, by setting:
-
2 e =  ) ( 2 2
- - t e ,
+
2 e =  ) ( 2 2
+ + t e . (4)
That is, we distinguish the type of coalition in function of the transfers granted (i.e. we
have a 
+
2 t  and a 
-
2 t  coalition, with 
-
2 t <  1 t < 
+
2 t ). That is, we will note  1 t  the amount of transfer
proposed by the player 1 (leader) and  2 t  the demands of player 2, the coalition, which
actually defines the type of the coalition. Hence, a  2 t
+-coalition will only accept a certain level
of effort in exchange of a significant transfer ( 2 t
+). On the contrary, a  2 t
--coalition will provide
the effort as soon as it gets a transfer equal to  2. t
-  We assume further that the leader wishes to
reach a global target e  which can be obtained by two ways: a low (respectively high) level of








2 e . In the first case, when the leader beliefs that he is faced with a
coalition able to provide a high level of effort, the leader has to offer a high level of transfer
2 t
+ to get a high effort. However, given the asymmetry of information, a high amount of
transfer does not guarantee a high level of effort. That is, the outcome may be a lower level
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+) =  1 p
+, p( 2 t
-) =  1 p
-= 1 -  1 p
+. (5)
This probability distribution implicitly refers to [ 2, t
-
2 t
+], as the efforts provided are a function
of the amount of transfer granted.
We set, without loss of generality:
+
1 1(e p , 2) t
- = 0, (6)
This means that the leader’s welfare is normalized to zero when he offers a small amount of
transfers ( 1 t = 2 t
-) to a  2 t
+-coalition. Since the demands of this coalition are high, it will refuse
to cooperate.
A family of conditional probabilities for the leader is an application that associates for
every history of transfer propositions and corresponding answers, a distribution of
probabilities on [ 2 t
-, 2 t
+]. Since the game has only two periods and finishes at the first period in
case of agreement, only conditional probabilities on the type of the coalition in case of a




distribution of probabilities of the leader at the beginning of the second period when the
amount  1 t  proposed in the first period was refused:
11 p
- = p( 2 t
-/ refusal  ) t1 and 11 p
+ = p( 2 t
+/ refusal  1) t = 1- 11 p
- . (7)
A pure strategy for the leader is a pair  1 (, t 11(.)) t  where  1 t  is the amount proposed at the
first period and  11(.) t  a function that associates a transfer  11 t  in the second period to any
transfer  1 t  refused in the first period (i.e., we note  11 t  the transfer proposed by player 1, the
leader, in the second period). A mixed strategy for the leader is formed by a distribution of
probabilities on  + ￿  and an application that associates, for any transfer  1 t  refused in the first
period, a distribution of probabilities on  + ￿  (the set of possible transfers for the second
period).
A pure strategy for the coalition is a pair of applications  2 ((.), f 22(.)). f  The first
application associates to its private information  2 t ˛[ 2, t
-
2 t
+] and to any transfer  1 t , an element
22 (, ft 1) t  of the set {a,r} of possible answers. The second application associates to the
private information, to any transfer  1 t  refused and to any  transfer  11 t , an element
22 (, ft 1, t 11) t  of {a,r}. A mixed strategy for the coalition is composed by (i) a family of10
distribution of probabilities on {a,r}, which are conditional to  2 (, t ) 1 t  and noted
222 (/, ft m 1), t  and (ii) a family of distribution on {a, r}, which are conditional to  2 (, t 1, t 11) t
and that we note  2222 (/, ft m 1, t 11). t
The equilibrium concept used is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The strategies of both
players in each period of the game, together with the associated beliefs, form a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium if the constraints of sequential rationality and Bayesian coherence hold:
(i) at every step of the game, the strategies are a Nash Bayesian equilibrium, given the beliefs;
(ii) following the equilibrium path, beliefs are determined according to Bayes’ rule.
We note  1 d  and  2 d  the discount factors of players 1 and 2 (with  01, i d <<  i=1,2). The
highest transfer accepted at the first period by the  2 t
--coalition when it anticipates that the
transfer proposed in the second period will be  11 t = 2 t
+ is noted  2 ˆ t . Thus,   2 ˆ t  is defined by:
(1- ) ( ) 2 2 2
- e C d =  ) ˆ , ( 2 2 1 2 t e e B
- + + -  ) , ( 2 2 1 2 2
+ - - + t e e B d .   (8)
We only consider variations of the game corresponding to pure strategies of the leader (i.e. we
exclude the possibility that the leader proposes a lottery, since this is not pertinent in the kind
of situations that we are modeling).
Definition
A perfect Nash Bayesian equilibrium (PNBE) of a game is a quadruplet of strategies
( ) ( ) [ ] (.) (.), , (.) (.), , , 2 1 11 11 1 1 f f t e t e and a system of beliefs  ( ) ( ) 111111 ,,(),() pppp
-+-+ Øø ￿￿ ºß  that
satisfies properties (1) and (2):
(1) For the system of beliefs  ( ) ( ) 111111 ,,(),() pppp
-+-+ Øø ￿￿ ºß  and for any stage of the game the
strategies of both players  ( ) ( ) [ ] (.) (.), , (.) (.), , , 2 1 11 11 1 1 f f t e t e  form a Nash Bayesian
equilibrium (NBE).
(2) For the equilibrium strategies, the system of beliefs follows Bayes’ rule.
Formally, this type of equilibrium is obtained by backward induction (Selten, 1965). In the
next section we will determine the Nash Bayesian equilibria in anyone of the two periods of
the game (since the rules of the game and the space of strategies are essentially the same in
the first and in the second period).11
2.2. Nash Bayesian equilibria
We will start by analyzing the outcome of the sub-game that takes place in each of the two
periods under consideration as if it would be a static game in itself. This will allow us to
compare the results in a static environment with the results in a dynamic framework.
However, and in order to be able to use the results in the next sub-section, we will use the
concept of Bayesian equilibrium.
In this game, a pure strategy for the leader is an amount of  transfer  1 t , and a mixed
strategy is a distribution of probability on 
+ ￿  (the set of all possible transfers). A pure
strategy for the coalition is a function  2 (.) f  which associates to its private information
2 t ˛[ 2, t
-
2 t
+] and to every proposed transfer  1 t  an element  22 (, ft 1) t  of the set of possible
answers {a,r}. A mixed strategy for the coalition ( noted  222 (/, ft m 1) t ) is a family of
probability distributions on {a, r} conditional to  2 (, t 1) t .
Given our assumptions, we can limit the pure strategies of the leader (uninformed) to the
non-dominated strategies  1 t = 2 t
+ and  1 t = 2 t
-, and to the mixed strategy  1 t =  22 (1) tt aa
+- +-  for
˛ a  [0,1]. If the leader adopts the pure strategy  1 t = 2, t
-  the expected gain is:
-
1 p E = ) , ( 2 2 1 1 1
- - + - + t e e p p +  ) , ( 2 1 1 1
- + + t e p p , (9)
and the  2 t
+-coalition will not accept the offer because the amount of transfer is lower than its
expected amount. If the leader chooses  1 t = 2 t
+, the expected gain is:
+
1 p E = ) , ( 2 2 1 1 1
+ - - - + t e e p p +  ) , ( 2 2 1 1 1
+ + - + + t e e p p . (10)
The pure strategy  1 t = 2 t
+ is optimal if and only if the expected gain associated to  1 t = 2 t
+ is
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. (11)
When this condition holds, the Bayesian equilibrium is, for the leader, to play the strategy
1 t = 2 t
+. That is, G gives us the minimum probability of being matched with a  2 t
+-coalition for
which the leader is interested in offering a high amount of transfer. This transfer will be
accepted by both types of coalition, since it is the maximum and they cannot expect a better
offer.
If the inequality is reversed:
1 p
+< G, (12)12
it is beneficial for the leader to propose  1 t = 2. t
-  This is the minimum transfer and only the  2 t
--
coalition (the coalition that will provide the lowest level of effort) will accept it.
Finally, if we have:
1 p
+= G, (13)
the Bayesian equilibrium consists for the leader to play the strategy  1 t = 2 t
+ with probability  a
and  1 t = 2 t
- with probability (1- a), for  ˛ a [0,1]. This means that the leader is indifferent
about playing  2 t
+ or  2 t
-. The coalition will accept the level of transfer  1 t  if it is at least equal to
the requested amount of transfer  2 t . This allows us to write the following proposition:
Proposition 1
The Nash Bayesian equilibrium is:
(i) for the leader to propose:
1 t = 2 t
+ if the beliefs of the uninformed player about the probability of being faced with
a strong coalition are high ( 1 pG
+ > );
1 t = 2 t
- if this beliefs are low ( 1 pG
+ < );
1 t =  22 (1) tt aa
+- +-  for a ˛ [0,1] if this beliefs are  1 pG
+ = .
(ii) for the coalition to accept any transfer such that  1 t ‡ 2 t .
The term in brackets in G (always positive) can be seen as the cost born by the leader
when it proposes  2 t
+ to a  2 t
--coalition (i.e. the cost associated to the asymmetry of information
in favor of the coalition). Thus, G can be seen as a measure of the relative importance of this
cost compared to the benefit obtained when  2 t
+ was the right amount to offer since the
coalition was  2 t
+ (i.e.  1122 (,) eet p
-++ + ). When this cost is high, the leader tends to offer a low
amount of transfer whereas he tends to offer a low transfer if the opposite is true.
Formally, we can rewrite the results in proposition 1 and specify each of the Nash
Bayesian equilibria based on the amount of transfers:
- either  1 t = 2 t
+ and  [ 22 (/, at m
-
1) t =1 and  22 (/, at m
+
1) t =1];
- or  1 t = 2 t
- and [ 22 (/, at m
-
1) t =1 and  22 (/, at m
+
1) t = 0];
- or  1 t =  22 (1) tt aa
+- +- for a ˛ [0,1] and
[ 22 (/, at m
-
1) t =1 if  1 t ‡ 2 t
-, = 0; and  22 (/, at m
+
1) t =1 if  1 t ‡ 2 t
+, = 0].13
As expected, the asymmetry of information reduces the optimality of negotiations, since
several inefficient issues are conceivable. No-agreement may be the outcome or an agreement
that does not reflect the type of the coalition. Actually, the responsibility for a positive
outcome corresponds to the leader. The signature of an agreement depends upon its capacity
to overcome the additional cost associated to the asymmetry of information. Even if this loss
is tolerable (i.e. it is compensated by the gain resulting from cooperation), it reduces the
expected gain of the leader.
2.3 Negotiation outcomes
We will now analyze the complete two stage game. We assume only two periods since we
are interested in investigating the impact of the minimal amount of dynamics on the results.
However, the approach could easily be extended to any (finite) number of periods.
Nevetheless, increasing the number of periods does not really add anything substantial, while
it obviously complicates the resolution. The negotiation outcomes are summarized in
equations (2) and (3).
Proposition 2
If  1 p
+> G, a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists:
(i) for the leader:
either  1 t = 2 t
+ and  111 () tt=  2 t
+,
or  1 t = 2 ˆ t  and  111 () tt=  2 t
+;
(ii) for the coalition:
22 (/, at m
+
1) t = 1 for  1 t ‡ 2 t
+, = 0 otherwise,
22 (/, at m
-
1) t = 1 for  1 t ‡ 2 ˆ t ,
22 (/, at m 1, t 11) t = 1 for  11 t ‡ 2 t , = 0 otherwise.
Proof : see appendix 1.
Consequently, with the conditions associated to proposition (2), we can distinguish two
possible perfect Bayesian equilibria. In the first one, the leader proposes the highest amount
of transfers at any period of the game. This is accepted in the first period by the coalition,
whatever its type. In the second possible equilibrium, the leader proposes the average amount14
2 ˆ t  in the first period and the maximum transfer  2 t
+ in the second period. If the coalition is a
2 t
--coalition, it accepts  2 ˆ t  in the first period. If it is a  2 t
+-coalition, it will wait until the second
period.
Proposition 3
If  1 p
+< G, there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
(i) for the leader:
either  1 t = 2 t
+ and [ 111 () tt=  2 t
+ or  111 () tt= 2 t
-],
or  1 t = 2 ˆ t  and  111 () tt=  2 t
+,
or  1 t = 2 t
- and  111 () tt= 2 t
-with probability
)] , ( ) , ( [
) , ( ) , (
) (
2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2
2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
1 + - - - - +
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(ii) for the coalition:
22 (/, at m
+
1) t = 1 for  1 t ‡ 2 t
+, = 0 otherwise,
22 (/, at m
-










22 (/, at m 1, t 11) t = 1 for  11 t ‡ 2 t , = 0 otherwise.
Proof : see appendix 2.
Proposition (3) shows that, depending on the parameters of the model, three equilibria are
possible. If the leader opens the negotiations by offering the maximum amount of transfer, the
coalition accepts it in the first period, whatever the type of the coalition. On the contrary, if
the leader proposes the average amount of transfer  2 ˆ t , only a  2 t
--coalition accepts it. In this
case, the leader proposes in the second period the maximum transfer, which is always
accepted. Thus, the asymmetry of information tends to reduce the leading position of the
leader. Finally, if the minimum amount of transfer is proposed in the first period and again,
with a probability  1 () t e , in the second period, the coalition accepts only if it is a  2 t
--coalition.
More precisely, the coalition accepts the offer with a certain probability in the first period,
and always in the second period if they refused it in the first.15
Extending negotiations for a finite number of periods does not ensure a less costly
agreement for the leader. Even more, the repetition can be disadvantageous for them. Indeed,
even if negotiations begin with a low amount of transfer, a coalition that has low requirements
and that anticipates for the following period a higher proposition (with a probability 1- 1 () t e ),
may behave as if it had higher demands. Thus, a refusal will not necessarily provide reliable
information about the type of the coalition. Moreover, when the leader gets a refusal, it has to
wait longer to obtain an agreement, which is an additional cost. In any case, propositions (2)
and (3) show that, although information is acquired during the negotiation due to the Bayesian
revision of the a priori probabilities, this does not ensure the signature of the agreement in the
first period. Thus, a first rank optimum will not necessary be obtained, since the discount
factors are strictly lower than one.
3. The model with the possibility of scission in the coalition
3.1 Nash Bayesian equilibria
Until now, we have considered the coalition as a stable coalition. This assumption reduces
the space of strategies of the members forming this coalition. Although this member can be
countries, football players or whatever, we will call them countries from now on to simplify
the exposition. When the coalition is a  2 t
+ coalition, its behavior is rather intransigent: it
commits itself only with an agreement on a high amount of transfer. We now consider that a
coalition with high claims may adapt its behavior to the offer of the leader. For a small offer
of amount of transfer, this coalition may split up into two sub-coalitions. Countries for which
the transfer that is proposed is equal to the sum of their claims form one sub-coalition (the
2 t
--coalition). More demanding countries form another sub-coalition (the ( 22 tt
+- - )-sub-
coalition). We assume that the total sum of demands of both sub-coalitions still equals  2 t
+,
with  222 ttt
+-- ->. In this context, negotiations may finish in the first period with one sub-
coalition and continue only with the stronger sub-coalition in the second period.
We suppose that the sub-coalition which has more (respectively less) demanding claims, ie
the ( 22 tt
+- - )-sub-coalition (respectively the  2 t
--sub-coalition), represents a proportion equal to
b  (respectively 1- b ). We obtain for a offer  1 t =  2 t
- of the leader:
-
1 p E = ) , ( 2 2 1 1 1
- - + - + t e e p p +  )]. , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( [ 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1
- - + - + + + - + t e e t e p p b bp (14)
When he offers  1 t =  2 t
+,  1 Ep
+ is given by equation (10). Using:16
) , ( ) , ( ) , (
) , ( ) , (
2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
+ - - - - + + + -
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,     (15)
we can write the following proposition:
Proposition 4
With the possibility of scission in the coalition, the Nash Bayesian equilibrium is:
(i) if  1 p
+> H, the leader proposes  1 t = 2 t
+, which is accepted by the coalition whatever its type;
(ii) if  1 p
+< H, the leader proposes  1 t = 2 t
-, which is accepted by a  2 t
--coalition and by a  2 t
--
sub-coalition;
(iii) if  1 p
+= H, the leader proposes  1 t =  2 t
+ with any probability and  1 t = 2 t
- with the
complementary probability. The offer is accepted by a  2 t -coalition if  1 t ‡ 2 t  and by a  2 t
--sub-
coalition if  2 t > 1 t .
Comparing Propositions (1) and (4) we can write the following corollary:
Corollary 1
The probability of reaching an agreement is larger with the possibility of a scission. The
probability of reaching an agreement based on a high amount of transfers is smaller with this
option.
Proof: direct from propositions (1) and (2) since GH £  given that 01 b ££ .
Hence, while the space of strategies is wider for a  2 t
+-coalition with the possibility of
scission, the possibility of reaching an agreement based on a high amount of transfer is
reduced. Thus, the leader will be more willing to propose a higher level of transfer in the
game where it may deal with an uncompromising  2 t
+-coalition (i.e. a coalition without the
possibility of scission) than in the case where a scission may occur. The intuition behind this
result lies in the difficulty to reach an agreement. In the game where the coalition may be
either a  2 t
--coalition or an uncompromising  2 t
+-coalition, negotiations may fail if the offer of
the leader is not high enough (if the coalition is of the type  2 t
+). By adopting the "all or
nothing" strategy, an uncompromising coalition faces the leader with an ultimatum. Since the
coalition knows its influence, it will reject any compromise which fails to meet its demands.17
To avoid the failure of negotiations, the leader has to offer  1 t =  2 t
+. This ultimatum situation
overwhelms the problem of potential free-riding by the  2 t
--coalition. On the contrary, in the
game with the possibility of scission, since some of the members of the coalition may accept
to adapt to the offer of the leader, the leader takes the signature of an agreement for granted.
Since he is no longer threatened by a negotiations failure, the leader will try to minimize the
risk of opportunist behavior from a  2 t
--coalition. Thus, the leader will be more willing to
propose a low amount of transfer and the probability of reaching an agreement on a high
amount of transfer shrinks. This is confirmed by the fact that the H-bound is a decreasing
function of  b . The higher the proportion of the coalition that would refuse the  2 t
- offer, the
nearer we come to the situation where the coalition is uncompromising. Therefore, the leader
is interested in avoiding the failure of negotiations.
3.2. Negotiation outcomes
We will know analyze the complete two period game with the possibility of scission. In
this configuration, if a proposition  1 t  during the first period is strictly lower than  2 t
+, then a  2 t
+
coalition may split up (or not). In this last section, we combine the three main characteristics
of negotiations: dynamics, asymmetric information and the possibility of scission. We can
write propositions (5) and (6).
Proposition 5















there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The equilibrium strategies for the leader are:
122 [,] ttt
-+ ˛  and  111 () tt=  2 t
+ or  111 () tt=  2 t
+-  2 t
-,
and for the coalition:
22 (/, at m
+
1) t = 1 for  1 t ‡ 2 t
+, = 1- b  for  2 t
+ > 1 t ‡ 2 ˆ t , = 0 otherwise,
22 (/, at m
-
1) t = 1 for  1 t ‡ 2 ˆ t , = 0 otherwise,
22 (/, at m 1, t 11) t = 1 for  11 t ‡ 2 t , = 0 otherwise.
Proof: see appendix 3.18
Proposition 6















there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The equilibrium strategies for the leader are:
either  122 ˆ [,[ ttt
- ˛  and  111 () tt=  2 t




or  122 ˆ [,] ttt
+ ˛  and  111 () tt=  2 t
+ or  111 () tt=  2 t
+-  2 t
-;
and for the coalition:
22 (/, at m
+
1) t = 1 for  1 t ‡ 2 t
+, = 1- b  for  2 t
+ >  1 t ‡ 2 ˆ t , = 0 otherwise
22 (/, at m
-
1) t = 1 for  1 t ‡ 2 ˆ t , = 0 otherwise
22 (/, at m 1, t 11) t = 1 for  11 t ‡ 2 t , = 0 otherwise.
Proof : same principle as the proof in appendix (3).
Proposition (5) shows that when the offer is rejected in the first period, an agreement will
always be signed at the second period, based on the maximum transfer. Since the proportion
of countries with strong demands inside the coalition is high, the leader will offer  2 t
+ in the
second period. With an offer in the  interval  22 [,[ tt
-+ , a refusal in the first period leads the
leader to determine with certainty his interlocutor’s type. If the initial offer was rejected by
the whole coalition, the leader will propose  2 t
+ in the second period. If a scission appeared in
the first period and only a sub-coalition rejected the offer (i.e. when the initial offer checked
2 t
+ > 1 t ‡ 2 ˆ t ), the leader will propose  ( 2 t
+-  2 t
-) to this sub-coalition in the second period.
As Proposition (6) shows, when the proportion of strong countries within the coalition is
low, the leader proposes  2 t
- in the second period. When the leader is faced with a refusal to an
offer comprised in  22 ˆ [,[ tt
-  in the first period, he is not able to determine with certainty the
type of the coalition. Thus, he will adopt a precautionary strategy and offer  2 t
- in the second
period. This may lead to the failure of the negotiations if the type of the coalition  is  2 t
+.
Finally, if the weak coalition ( 2 t
--coalition) refuses the proposition in the first period to accept
that of the second period, we get a configuration for which by prolonging the negotiation, it
looses all the advantages that it had due to its private information.19
Remark that in propositions (5) and (6) the bound separating one or another proposal from
the leader is not anymore the beliefs about the strength/weakness of the coalition ( 1 p
+ or  11 p
+ )
but the proportion of strong (weak) members forming the original coalition ( b ). That is:
Corollary 2
If a scission is possible and the proportion of weak/strong members of the coalition is known,
the system of beliefs  ( ) ( ) 111111 ,,(),() pppp
-+-+ Øø ￿￿ ºß  plays no role in shaping the offers of the
leader.
Proof: direct from propositions (5) and (6).
At least since Riker (1962) we know that coalitions tend to split up to its minimum
expression, however, what we have shown here is that even before they have split up the
leader of the negotiation does not anymore “see” the nominal coalition and already focuses on
the proportion of strong/weak members while shaping his offers. However, whatever the
value of  b  we have situations where the coalitions stays together and only single offers and
unique answers are observed, so that a model assuming that the coalition does not really exist
would miss the point.
We can now compare negotiations with and without the possibility of scission. Without the
possibility of scission, an agreement will only be reached if the coalition gets at least its
minimum requirements. On the contrary, with the possibility of scission we can obtain as
many possible agreements as possible amounts of transfers exist. Therefore, the leader should
prefer to enter negotiations when a scission is still possible. The scission allows the formation
of a sub-coalition that adapts its behavior to the leader’s proposal, even if the initial coalition
was potentially able to demand more. The probability of reaching an agreement is higher, but
based on reduced objectives.
From the point of view of a strong coalition ( 2 t
+-coalition), the absence of the possibility of
scission increases its credibility vis-à-vis the leader. Since the  2 t
+-coalition knows its
informational power, it will choose, if this option is available, not to have the possibility of
scission to make this power effective. This alternative is even more attractive since this
commitment implies significant transfers. Thus, it becomes possible to explain the stability of
the coalition based on the capacity of the members of the coalition to preserve their private20
information. The asymmetry of information strategically favors them as long as they remain
within the same coalition. Producing a scission will automatically reveal the characteristics of
the coalition. Thus, in spite of the asymmetry of information, the game will turn in favor of
the leader. On the contrary, banning the possibility of a scission forces the leader into a
negotiation with a reduced probability of reaching an agreement, and forces him to propose a
high amount of transfers.
Coming back to our examples, we have shown that when negotiating with the United
States the European Union should try to preclude any scission if it wants to keep the
advantages of its private information and to have high chances to obtain an important transfer
(e.g. political concessions). Of course, on the other hand, the United States are interested in
“dividing to conquer” if the scission is possible. As stated above, the G77 and China have
tried to follow the first line in climate change negotiations, while the National Football
League followed the second line in the 1981’s labor negotiations.
4. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic
players, in the sense that the agents starting negotiations can split-up in smaller entities during
the bargaining process. We have shown that the possibility of scission in the informed
coalition implies that it looses its information advantages. We have also shown that with the
possibility of scission the uninformed player does not focus on his or her beliefs about the
strength of the informed coalition but on the proportion of weak/strong players within this
coalition. Finally, we have shown that the absence of the possibility of scission increases the
chances to obtain an agreement based on high amount of transfers, while the possibility of
scission increases the chances to obtain an agreement, but based on more modest objectives.
Examples in international negotiations on global public goods, such as war against
international terrorism or climate change, and in wage negotiations have shown the relevance
of explicitly considering the possibility of scission when modeling negotiations between non-
monolithic players (i.e. a coalition of countries, such as the European Union or the G77 and
China, or a trade union).21
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Appendix 1: Proof of proposition (2)
- Suppose an equilibrium in which the transfer announced during the first period by the leader
is  1 t ˛[ 2, t
-
2 t
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Since we are in the case where:  1 p
+> G, for any  1 t ˛[ 2, t
-
2 t
+[ and for any  22 (/, rt m
-
1), t we have
111 pp
-- <  ,  111 pp
++ >    and    11 Ep
+ > 111 EE pp
-- ‡ . This last condition gives:
) , ( 2 2 1 1 11
+ - - - + t e e p p +  ) , ( 2 2 1 1 11
+ + - + + t e e p p > ‡ +
- - + - ) , ( 2 2 1 1 1 t e e p p ). , ( 2 2 1 1 11
- - + - + t e e p p
The left hand side of the inequality is the net expected gain of the leader at the second period,
estimated at the beginning of the second period when  2 t
+ was proposed. The right hand side
represents the net gain when  2 t
- was proposed. Thus, for any equilibrium satisfying
1 t ˛[ 2, t
-
2 t
+[ and where the coalition refuses the offer, the leader will propose  2 t
+ in the second
period.
- In any equilibrium with  1 t ˛[ 2, t
-
2 t
+[, only the  2 t
--coalition could accept the offer in the first
period and, by definition of  2 ˆ t , we have  22 (/, at m
-
1) t =1 if  1 t ‡ 2 ˆ , t  = 0 otherwise. Proposition
(2) indicates the coalition’s behavior in the second period. In any equilibrium of this kind, the
expected gain for the leader is:  ) , ( 1 2 1 1 1 t e e p
- + - + p +  ) , ( 2 2 1 1 1 1
+ + - + + t e e p p d  if  1 t ‡ 2 ˆ t .
- The leader is not interested in deviating from this equilibrium. Since his characteristics are
known by the coalition, he cannot modify the coalition’s beliefs by playing a strategy outside
the equilibrium.
- The coalition is not interested in deviating from the equilibrium either. A deviation consists
for the coalition in changing its response to the first proposition of the leader. However, since
the leader will play at the equilibrium, in any case,   2 t
+ in the second period, such deviation is
unfavorable for the coalition.23
Appendix 2: Proof of proposition (3)
- If  1 t = 2 t
+, the coalition accepts the offer whatever its type. Indeed:  22 (/, at m 2) t
+ =  1  "
2 t ‡ 2 t
+. The negotiation is over in the first period and the net gain for the leader is:
) , ( 2 2 1 1 1 1
+ - - - + + = t e e p E p p + ) , ( 2 2 1 1 1
+ + - + + t e e p p .
- If  1 t ˛[ 2 ˆ , t 2 t
+[, by definition of  2 ˆ t , the coalition does not accept if it is an  2 t
--type, since in
this case  22 (/, at m
-
1) t = 1, by definition of  2 ˆ t  since in all cases  2 t £ 2 t
+. On the contrary, if the
coalition is a  2 t
+-type, it will refuse the offer since  22 (/, at m
+
1) t = 0. Hence:  11 p
+ =1. Thus, in
case of refusal in the first period, the leader knows that it faces a  2 t
+-coalition and will propose
2 t
+. Their expected gain  is  ) , ( ) , ( 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
+ + - + - + - + + + t e e p t e e p p d p . This expression is
maximal for  1 t =  2 ˆ t .
- If  2 ˆ t > 1 t ‡ 2, t
-  we will suppose that the proposition  1 t  has been refused, in order to
determine the offer in the second period. In this case:  22 (/, at m
+
1) t = 0.
Let g  be the value of  22 (/, at m
-
1) t  that leaves the leader indifferent between  2 t
- and  2 t
+ in the
second period when the  2 t
+-coalition refuses  1 t .
As shown in appendix (1), the reviewed distribution of probabilities of the leader about the
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But, since the leader is indifferent about the gains obtained by strategies  11 t =  2 t
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Hence, we will show that when  2 ˆ t > 1 t ‡ 2 t
-:
22 (/, at m
-
1) t = g .
We know that undominated pure strategies of the leader in the second period are  11 t =  2 t
+ and
11 t =  2 t
-. Thus,  2 t
+ is preferred to  2 t
- if and only if:24
22 (/, at m
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In general: (i) the leader plays  111 () tt=  2 t
+ if and only if  22 (/, at m
-
1) t > g ; (ii) plays  111 () tt=
2 t
- if and only if  22 (/, at m
-
1) t < g  ; and (iii) plays some mixed strategy on [ 2 t
-, 2 t
+], that we
note  1 [() t e , 1- 1 ()] t e , if and only if  22 (/, at m
-
1) t =g . Consequently, three cases have to be
considered.
1
st case:  22 (/, at m
-
1) t > g .
In this case the leader plays  111 () tt=  2 t
+ in the second period. The  2 t
--coalition which
anticipates this strategy, never accepts a proposition  1 t < 2 ˆ t  in the first period. Hence,
" 1 t ˛[ 2 t
-, 2 t ˆ [  22 (/, at m
-
1) t =0, which contradicts the hypothesis  22 (/, at m
-
1) t >g . Thus, this
case is impossible.
2
nd case:  22 (/, at m
-
1) t < g .
The coalition knows that the leader will propose  11 t =  2 t
- in the second period. They are
interested in accepting any offer  1 t ˛[ 2 t
-, 2 ˆ t [. Hence,  22 (/, at m
-
1) t =1  " 1 t ˛[ 2 t
-, 2 ˆ t [, and we
find another contradiction. Thus, " 1 t ˛[ 2 t
-, 2 ˆ t [ we must have:
22 (/, at m
-
1) t = g .
In this case both coalitions adopt a mixed strategy. The question is now how to make the
associated probabilities compatible to get a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Since the  2 t
--coalition plays a mixed strategy (to accept the strategy  1 t  with a probability
g ˛]0,1[), it is indifferent about accepting  1 t  or refusing  1 t . If it accepts, its net gain is:
) , ( 1 2 1 2 t e e
- + + p . If it refuses, its expected net gain is:
) , ( 11 2 1 2 t e e E
- + + p =  ) , ( )) ( 1 ( ) , ( ) ( [ 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
+ - - - - + + - + + t e e t t e e t p e p e d .
Thus, we must have:
) , ( 1 2 1 2 t e e
- + + p = ) , ( 11 2 1 2 t e e E
- + + p ,
or:
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Since we know the values of g  and  1 () t e , we can calculate the expected gain for the leader
associated to this mixed strategy:25
) , ( 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 t e e p E













) , ( 2 2 1 1 1
- - + + t e e p d .
This gain is maximized with  1 t =  2. t
-  Thus, the leader adopts the strategy:  1 t = 2, t
-   111 () tt= 2 t
-
with a probability  1 () t e , and  111 () tt=  2 t
+ with the complementary probability.
Appendix 3: Proof of proposition (5)
To have a complete proof, follow the same reasoning as for proposition (2). We will just show
that in the second period, the leader will propose  2 t
+ under condition (16). We consider the
case in which: (i) the offer  1 t  has been refused, and (ii) the leader reviews its beliefs
according to Bayes’ rule and adopts the optimal strategy  111 () tt=  2 t
+ if and only if
11 Ep
+ > 11 Ep
- . Thus:
11 p

















p(r) =  22 (/, rt m
-
11 ) tp
-  +  22 (/, rt m
-
11 )(1) tp b
- - + 22211 (/,) rtttp mb
+-+ -
22111 (/,)(2) rttpp mbb
--+ =-+
Condition (16) can be deduced from the following inequalities:
11 p
- < 1 p
- and  11 p
+ > 1 p
+ . 
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